The tragic incident on January 29, when an Army Black Hawk helicopter collided with an American Airlines regional jet over the Potomac River by Ronald Reagan National Airport, resulted in the loss of all lives on board.
However, this catastrophic crash, the worst in the U.S. in nearly 25 years, wasn’t due to just one mistake. Modern aviation incorporates multiple fail-safes and systems designed to avoid potentially disastrous errors. An investigation by The New York Times revealed that, on that night, these systems failed.
Previously, the focus had been on the Black Hawk’s altitude, which was too high and interfered with the jet’s landing approach. New revelations from The Times highlight that the underlying issues were actually much more intricate.
Here are five key insights from the investigation:
The Black Hawk crew did not properly follow a common yet risky aviation practice.
This practice, known as “see and avoid,” requires pilots to visually observe nearby air traffic, often without relying on air traffic controllers, and to maneuver to avoid collisions, either by remaining still until the traffic passes or by taking prescribed detours.
One advantage of the see-and-avoid approach is that it can ease the workload for controllers during peak times. Unfortunately, this technique has been linked to numerous fatal accidents in recent decades, being responsible for at least 40 deadly collisions since 2010, according to the National Transportation Safety Board.
On the night of the accident, the Black Hawk pilots failed to implement the see-and-avoid strategy effectively. They either did not recognize the specific passenger jet identified by the controller or couldn’t maneuver to a safer position, leading them directly into the landing path of American Airlines Flight 5342.
The air traffic controller could have issued a more alarming warning concerning the approaching aircraft.
Although the air traffic controller that night had assigned the responsibility of avoiding other aircraft to the Black Hawk crew, he continued to monitor the helicopter as required. Yet, experts suggest that he did not provide clear and urgent instructions to the Black Hawk to prevent the impending crash.
As the aircraft neared each other, the controller instructed the helicopter to pass behind the American Airlines plane.
Some former military pilots noted that by giving that direction, the controller exceeded his responsibilities, particularly under see-and-avoid circumstances, and argued that an experienced Black Hawk crew should have been aware of the necessary actions without assistance.
However, some regulators and controllers believe the controller could have done more.
He could have indicated to the Black Hawk crew the position and heading of Flight 5342. (The Federal Aviation Administration instructs controllers to use clock hours to describe aircraft locations.) He could also have given the distance of the jet from the helicopter in nautical miles or feet.
Crucially, when two aircraft are on a collision course, the top priority for the controller is to alert both pilot teams. “Advise the pilots if the targets appear likely to merge,” as per F.A.A. regulations.
Unfortunately, that did not happen.
Technology did not function as it should have.
Radio communications, the standard method of interaction between controllers and pilots, also encountered issues. Some of the controller’s instructions were “stepped on” — meaning they were interrupted when the helicopter crew pressed their microphone to talk — leading to important messages potentially going unheard.
Additionally, technology on the Black Hawk that would have helped controllers monitor the helicopter was switched off. This decision stemmed from the mission’s confidentiality, as the helicopter’s positions could be tracked via the internet when that technology was active, posing a national security risk.
Consequently, the controller depended on pings from the helicopter’s transponder to track its location on radar, which also had a refresh time of five to 12 seconds, as outlined by F.A.A. documents.
In busy airspace, that delay, according to Michael McCormick, former vice president of the F.A.A. Air Traffic Organization, is “a very long time.”
The flight path of the helicopter and the runway of the jet created a particularly hazardous scenario.
Towards the end of his shift, the controller managing both helicopters and commercial jets attempted a complex, and potentially risky, maneuver known in aviation circles as a squeeze play.
This approach aims to ensure smooth operations by tightly scheduling runway activities with minimal gaps between takeoffs or landings, as explained by veteran controllers at National Airport.
The landing of Flight 5342 from Wichita, Kansas, was intended to be part of this operation, so the controller decided to have that flight land on the lesser-used Runway 33 instead of the more typical Runway 1.
Runway 33 presented a specific challenge: a notably narrow vertical gap between the landing path for planes and the highest altitude at which helicopters on a specific route, called Route 4, were permitted to fly.
According to N.T.S.B. investigators, at its highest point, close to the east bank of the Potomac, the vertical distance between a helicopter and an aircraft approaching Runway 33 was only 75 feet. Yet if a helicopter strayed further from the river toward the airport, that distance would shrink even more.
With such a narrow margin for error, it was essential for the helicopter to fly below the maximum allowed altitude for that route.
That night, the Black Hawk was flying higher than permitted, endangering everyone on both aircraft.
The Black Hawk pilot ignored a directive from her co-pilot to change direction.
The Army crew’s mission involved an annual assessment of Capt. Rebecca M. Lobach to ensure her helicopter piloting skills were adequate.
On that night, her task was to navigate a scenario simulating a situation where high-ranking government officials might need to be evacuated from the capital in the event of an attack. Chief Warrant Officer 2 Andrew Loyd Eaves served as her instructor.
In the last moments before the crash, Warrant Officer Eaves instructed Captain Lobach that the air traffic controller wanted her to make a left turn.
This turn could have created additional space between the helicopter and Flight 5342, which was approaching Runway 33 at around 300 feet. However, there is no evidence that she complied with that instruction. Instead, the helicopter continued directly into the jet’s path.
