Islamabad, Pakistan – Following a tragic incident where gunmen killed 26 people in Baisaran, a picturesque area in Indian-administered Kashmir’s Pahalgam, tensions are rising between India and Pakistan, potentially leading to military conflict.
Since the attack on April 22, both countries have retaliated with a series of actions. India has suggested that Pakistan is responsible for the attack, a claim Islamabad denies. In response, India has halted its involvement in the Indus Waters Treaty, crucial for Pakistan’s water supply. Meanwhile, Pakistan has threatened to withdraw from the 1972 Simla Agreement, which recognizes a ceasefire line as the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir—an area claimed by both nations. Both countries have also expelled each other’s diplomats and reduced their diplomatic presence.
This latest escalation is the most severe since 2019, when India conducted air strikes in Pakistan after a deadly attack on its soldiers in Pulwama. Recently, both nations have exchanged gunfire across the LoC.
An atmosphere of anxiety prevails as many anticipate that India may launch a military operation against Pakistan once again.
However, both countries are also reaching out to their diplomatic allies. On Wednesday, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio urged both Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif of Pakistan and Indian Foreign Minister S Jaishankar to pursue de-escalation. U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth also spoke with Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh to denounce the attack and express strong support for India.
Furthermore, Sharif met with ambassadors from China, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE—key allies of Pakistan—to seek their backing and asked the diplomats to encourage India to reduce tensions.
To gain insight into how Pakistani strategists view the situation, Al Jazeera spoke with Moeed Yusuf, who served as Pakistan’s National Security Adviser from May 2021 to April 2022 under former Prime Minister Imran Khan.
Previously, Yusuf was a special advisor to Khan on national security matters beginning in December 2019, shortly after the Indian government revoked the special status of Indian-administered Kashmir.
Currently, Yusuf is the vice chancellor of a private university in Lahore and has written extensively on South Asia and regional security. His latest book, “Brokering Peace in Nuclear Environments: U.S. Crisis Management in South Asia,” was published in 2018.
Al Jazeera: How do you view the actions taken by both sides during this crisis?
Moeed Yusuf: India and Pakistan have always faced challenges in crisis management. They lack a bilateral mechanism to manage these crises effectively, which is a key concern.
Historically, both nations have relied on third-party intervention as their primary crisis management strategy, hoping that this will restrain both sides and help reduce tensions.
This time, India seems to have followed its usual strategies, but the U.S., a crucial third party, did not come forward to support India.
The U.S. appears to be maintaining a neutral stance, which is not akin to their usual involvement. Recently, Donald Trump mentioned that he believes the leaders of both countries can resolve their issues independently, indicating this hands-off approach.
Pakistan’s response is always influenced by India’s actions, and this situation is no different, with both nations continuing their cycle of retaliation. The recent punitive measures announced are easy to implement but hard to roll back, even if both sides desire to ease tensions later.
Regrettably, in every crisis, retaliatory measures become more severe, as seen with India putting the Indus Water Treaty on hold, an action that lacks legal justification according to the treaty.
Al Jazeera: Do you think a strike is on the horizon, and are both sides preparing for confrontation?
Yusuf: It’s difficult to predict such events accurately. While India’s military actions remain a possibility, the immediate threat of an attack is less pressing now.
In crises, countries often observe troop movements or gather intelligence from allies, sometimes leading to misinterpretations—a defensive side may mistakenly believe an attack is coming, while the offensive side might see a supposed opportunity to strike.
Pakistan must prepare for all possibilities; readiness is essential given the unpredictable nature of these situations.
While I don’t foresee a major war, predicting outcomes in such scenarios is challenging. A mere misunderstanding or miscalculation could escalate tensions significantly.
Al Jazeera: How do you perceive the role of third parties, including the U.S., China, and Gulf States, in this crisis compared to previous instances?
Yusuf: My latest book focused on third-party involvement in the India-Pakistan context, highlighting its crucial role since both countries have come to expect external mediation.
The hope is that a mediator will intervene before the situation escalates further, which is a common desire for both nations.
The U.S. has historically led this third-party role, especially since the Kargil conflict in 1999. Other nations, including China, generally align with the U.S. approach of advocating for immediate de-escalation in crises.
However, the dynamics changed somewhat during the 2016 surgical strikes and the 2019 Pulwama incident, where the U.S. seems to have leaned toward India, perhaps inadvertently encouraging bolder actions from New Delhi.
(In 2016, Indian forces conducted a surgical strike across the border targeting militants they believed were planning attacks on India, following a deadly assault that resulted in the deaths of 19 Indian soldiers at an army base.)
In Uri, located in Indian-administered Kashmir, a significant incident occurred. Three years later, Indian fighter jets attacked what New Delhi identified as “terrorist” bases in Balakot, in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. This was in response to an assault on an Indian military convoy that resulted in the deaths of 40 soldiers. Following this, India and Pakistan were involved in an aerial confrontation, resulting in the capture and later return of an Indian pilot.
This time, however, the president in the White House instructed both Pakistan and India to resolve their own issues.
This stance may have adversely affected India more than Pakistan, as Pakistan had already diminished expectations of significant U.S. support in recent years, perceiving that the U.S. had grown closer to India through their strategic partnership.
Conversely, India likely anticipated U.S. pressure on Pakistan, which did not come to fruition. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s communications have favored a neutral approach, urging both sides to avoid conflict.
Interestingly, this has restrained India, which hasn’t felt as confident to act as it might have during the Pulwama incident in 2019.
Meanwhile, Gulf nations have taken a more proactive role than before, and China has also called for restraint.
Al Jazeera: How has the relationship between Pakistan and India changed in recent years?
Yusuf: There has been a significant shift in the dynamics between the two nations. During my time in office, despite serious challenges and India’s unilateral actions in Kashmir in 2019, we managed to achieve a ceasefire agreement along the Line of Control and engage in behind-the-scenes discussions.
We aimed to diminish India’s incentive to destabilize Pakistan; however, it seems that India has missed that chance due to its own stubbornness and an ideological stance that continues to belittle and threaten Pakistan.
This situation has also transformed Pakistan’s outlook, where the leadership is now convinced that a policy of restraint has not yielded results and that India has taken advantage of its overtures for dialogue.
The current sentiment is that if India is not interested in discussions, Pakistan will no longer beg for them. If India does reach out, we may respond, but there is no urgency on Pakistan’s part.
The current circumstances are not favorable for either nation. I have consistently argued that for Pakistan to progress economically and for India to achieve its regional ambitions, both countries must improve their relationship. Sadly, with India’s present attitude, I see little optimism for that happening anytime soon.
Al Jazeera: Do you expect any direct talks between India and Pakistan at any level during or following this crisis?
Yes – while I cannot predict when or how this will happen, I believe a crucial takeaway for India from this situation could be that efforts to isolate Pakistan haven’t succeeded.
The Indus Water Treaty? The potential suspension of the Simla Agreement? These are significant matters that necessitate dialogue between the two nations. I anticipate they will engage at some point in the future.
However, I don’t foresee Pakistan initiating a move towards closer ties, as we have extended opportunities for dialogue many times before with no success. The sentiment within Pakistan has also become firmly resolved on this issue.
Ultimately, it’s up to India to decide if they wish to engage in discussions. If they do, I believe Pakistan would respond positively.
*This interview has been edited for clarity and brevity.
