China has been enhancing its maritime presence in the Pacific. Recently, it has become the third largest player in the region, trailing only the US and Australia, as noted by Anne-Marie Brady, an expert in Chinese, Pacific, and polar politics at the University of Canterbury in New Zealand.
In the past year, China has registered 26 Coast Guard vessels to operate under the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Analysts have indicated that these vessels often participate in grey-zone tactics in disputed waters.
This allows the designated Coast Guard vessels the legal authority to board foreign fishing vessels operating in the vast high seas area that covers nearly 20 percent of the planet. This area notably includes all three island chains.
These vessels are frequently used to reinforce China’s maritime claims in contested regions of the South China Sea, including areas near Philippine territories. Their activities have led to heightened tensions, with Manila accusing them of obstructing resupply efforts and using water cannons against Filipino vessels.
STRUGGLE FOR STRATEGIC DOMINANCE
China’s approach toward the Second Island Chain has been calculated and multifaceted, particularly aimed at protecting what it considers vital national interests, according to Ridzwan from Janes.
“China relies on maritime routes for 80 percent of its energy supplies. Its land connections with Russia and Pakistan aren’t sufficient to satisfy its energy import needs,” he explained.
“The US could easily disrupt China’s maritime communication lines that extend beyond the First Island Chain. Hence, the focus on the Second Island Chain is to ensure these routes remain open,” he added.
Davis from ASPI argues that China’s interests extend beyond merely safeguarding communication lines; it aims to create offensive capabilities as well.
“It’s about establishing a foundation for a future presence that could disrupt crucial maritime communication between Australia and the US, as well as those routes south of Australia through the Coral Sea to Japan,” he told CNA.
Considering this context, he noted that the US has intensified efforts in Micronesia to secure essential sea lines of communication and counter China’s growing influence in the Pacific. Davis likened this back-and-forth to a “game of geostrategic wei qi,” referencing the Chinese game Go.
In Go, players often strategically place stones across the board to build influence without overstretching in one area. Davis pointed out that this reflects the US strategy of distributing forces across the Second Island Chain to enhance resilience and lessen vulnerability against targeted strikes.
Concurrently, the increasing US focus on defense in the western Pacific is fueled by escalating concerns over China’s advanced anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, he added.
A2/AD is a military strategy designed to restrict adversaries from freely entering or operating within a specified region. It employs tools such as long-range missiles, air defenses, naval resources, along with cyber warfare and electronic disruption.
China’s advancing military capabilities are making it increasingly difficult for the US and its allies to operate effectively or maintain a foothold within the first island chain, which serves as China’s immediate maritime barrier, Davis noted.
“China is extending its counter-intervention capabilities further out and enhancing its A2/AD strategies, leading to a situation where the potential costs for the US to operate near its shores are becoming prohibitively high,” he said.
“Therefore, the US seeks to utilize the Second Island Chain, centered around Guam, to project its power and prevent China from extending its influence beyond the chain into the broader oceans.”
